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THE JOURNAL IN REVIEW. A LOOK BACK AT TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Continuing throughout the 25th Anniversary volume, the Editors
will occasionally select for re-publication outstanding articles and
comments from our twenty-five year history. Our annual Sympo-
sium is an important part of that history, and the three Articles re-
printed below-a debate between two professors largely played
out over the pages of this Journal -exemplify the quality of the in-
tellectual discourse that the Symposium has fostered over the
years. Our next issue coming this fall, which will primarily relate
to the 2004 Symposium, continues this fine tradition.
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1. INTRODUCrION
Slightly more than one year ago, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade' went through a striking metamorphosis as it
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1 See The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on
Tariffs & Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
was folded into the World Trade Organization.2 Whether the ugly
duckling 3 that was the GATT has grown into a swan cannot yet be
stated with any certainty. What is certain, however, is that the
creation of the World Trade Organization represents a serious
change in the regulatory environment of international trade-a
change that, in turn, could affect the global economy on an enor-
mous scale.
Much of the World Trade Organization's potential effect is
quantifiable in dollars. Accompanying the creation of the World
Trade Organization are decreases in tariff and nontariff barriers
that should increase the value of the world economy by between
212 billion and 500 billion dollars.4 The import of these interna-
tional regulatory changes is not, however, entirely numerical.
While agreements attached to the World Trade Organization's
charter do provide for reductions in tariffs,5 the charter itself also
creates powerful new means of creating trade policies 6 and resolv-
[hereinafter GATT 1947]. This essay will follow the general usage and refer to the
document as the "General Agreement" and the quasi-institution that evolved to
administer the document as the "GATT."
2 See The WTO Enters into Force, Focus: GATT NEWSLETrER (GATT Info. &
Media Relations Div., Geneva), Dec. 1994, at 1; David E. Sanger, U.S. Threatens
$2.8 Billion of Tariffs on China Exports, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1995, at 14. The GATT, as
an institution, ceased to exist on Dec. 31, 1995. See Frances Williams, GATT's Spirit
Lives on As Talk Marks Its Final Hour, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at 5.
3 The General Agreement was awkward because it was neither a treaty nor
an institution but, out of necessity, developed attributes of both. "As an institu-
tion, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a complex and un-
tidy thing. There is not even a consensus as to what it should be called." Gardner
Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Road from GATT to MTO, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
35, 35 (1994) (footnote omitted). See infra note 40 (discussing the history of the
GATT).
4 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK MAY 1994,
at 83, 86-87 (1994) (discussing estimates of the Uruguay Round's effects on global
income).
5 See GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1165 (1994) (establishing schedules for tariff reduction) [hereinafter Final
Act]; see also Alan Riding, 109 Nations Sign Trade Agreement: 7 Years of Struggle to
Reduce Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1994, at 35, 48 (stating that the Uruguay Round
Agreements would reduce industrial and agricultural tariffs by an average of
forty percent).
6 Two legislative bodies associated with the World Trade Organization -the
Ministerial Conference and the General Council-will formulate trade policy.
Under the overall guidance of the General Council, the World Trade Organization
Agreement establishes a Council for Trade in Goods, a Council for Trade in Ser-
vices, and a Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
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ing disputes that arise under those policies.7 International trade
policy will no longer be created in separate, cumbersome rounds of
multilateral negotiations; instead, the World Trade Organization
will be a permanent forum in which trade policy can be promul-
gated and fine-tuned.8 Furthermore, the decisions of trade dispute
panels are no longer subject to veto by the losing country; instead,
the decisions of these panels will automatically be adopted by the
World Trade Organization. 9
The import of these changes has not escaped the attention of
policymakers or scholars. In a recent article,10 for example, this au-
thor argues that the power of the World Trade Organization to
force national law into conformity with its trade norms is a power
that must be exercised with restraint.11 In particular, laws that
primarily reflect important underlying societal values and only in-
cidentally impede trade should not be subjected to scrutiny by the
World Trade Organization.
The trade agreements annexed to the World Trade Organiza-
tion charter act as a template against which national laws are
measured. A complaint may be lodged against one member by
another if the former's legal regime does not comply with the tem-
plate and the violation nullifies or impairs a benefit that is sup-
posed to accrue to the complaining member.' 2 If the complaining
member and the violating member cannot agree upon a solution,
then the complaint will be submitted to a dispute resolution panel,
These Councils will: carry out functions assigned by the General Council; estab-
lish their respective rules of procedure; be open to representatives of all Members;
meet as necessary to carry out their functions; and establish subsidiary bodies as
required. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act,
supra note 5, art. IV, 33 I.L.M. at 1145-46 [hereinafter Charter].
7 The process for resolving trade disputes under a World Trade Organization
covered agreement is set forth in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Final Act, supra note 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1226
[hereinafter Understanding].
8 See Charter, supra note 6, art. 11(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1144 ("The WTO shall pro-
vide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations
among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal in-
struments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.").
9 See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 16(4), 21, 33 I.L.M. at 1235, 1238.
10 See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658 (1996).
11 See id. at 700, 719.
12 See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 3, 23, 33 I.L.M. at 1227-28, 1241-42. In
many cases, the nullification or impairment of a benefit is itself a violation of the
trade agreements. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 94 (1989).
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which will operate in a quasi-judicial fashion.13 If the dispute reso-
lution panel does in fact find a violation, it will "recommend that
the Member concerned bring the [violative] measure into confor-
mity with" the trade agreements.14 A panel decision, however,
may not "add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in
the covered agreements." 15 The panel's decision is then voted on
by the Dispute Settlement Body, or, if the losing party so desires,
the decision may be appealed to an Appellate Body and then voted
13 See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 6-12, 33 I.L.M. at 1230-34.
14 Id. art. 19(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1237 (footnote omitted). The first finding by a
panel convened by the World Trade Organization has made such a recommenda-
tion. The complaint, brought by Venezuela and Brazil, involved U.S. standards
for reformulated gasoline. Such gasoline was required to be 15% cleaner by 1995
than that sold in 1990. Each U.S. producer was allowed to measure the improve-
ment against the quality of the reformulated gasoline that it actually produced in
1990, whereas foreign producers were held to a single, and in most cases higher,
standard. In keeping with a questionable (and in practice almost always circum-
vented) rule that findings not be released until final, the finding of the dispute
resolution panel has not yet been made public. Those who have read it, however,
report that the panel opined that the United States is free to do whatever it wishes
with its environmental policy so long as it does not discriminate against foreign
producers and does not shelter domestic producers.
While news of the panel's decision resulted in predictable election year rhetoric,
the finding itself is a nonevent. The differing standards are facially discrimina-
tory- the office of the United States Trade Representative itself warned Congress
several years ago of this fact. Additionally, Congress seems to have been motivated
in this instance not by environmental impulses, but instead by a desire to protect
U.S. producers. To illustrate, Congress, at the insistence of domestic producers, or-
dered the Environmental Protection Agency to stop work that the agency had begun
on a unitary standard. Moreover, the statute ceases to extend preferential treatment
to U.S. producers by 1998, which is about the same time that the dispute resolution
process will render a final ruling. Thus, before the process ultimately concludes, the
issue could well be moot. Venezuela, in fact, has indicated that even though the rul-
ing was in its favor, it has no plans to increase production of reformulated gasoline.
Finally, although this particular decision found a U.S. law to be violative, it sets
a precedent that generally will benefit U.S. producers. Similarly, environmental ad-
vocates have argued that congressional protection of the domestic oil industry gen-
erally hinders environmental causes. See U.S. Charges WTO Panel On Gasoline From
Venezuela Exceeded Legal Mandate, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 9 (Feb. 28, 1996);
Bhushan Bahree, WTO Panel Rules Against U.S. In Dispute Over Gasoline Norms,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996, at All; Paul Blustein, WTO Ruling Draws Fierce Criticism,
WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1996, at F3; Gerald Karey, Regulation and the Environment,
PLAr's OiLGRAm NEws, Feb. 5, 1996, at 3; Jane Knight, Despite Win, PDVSA Sits Tight
On RFG, PLATr's OILGRAM NEws, Jan. 17, 1996, at 4; David E. Sanger, World Trade
Group Orders U.S. to Alter Clean Air Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at Dl; Frances Wil-
liams, US May Appeal Against TO Ruling, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996, at 4;... And the
WTO Flaplet, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,1996, at A18.
15 Understanding, supra note 7, art. 19(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1237.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss2/6
2004] EXTENSION OF STANDING 673
upon by the Dispute Settlement Body.16
Procedure aside, what is pertinent is the dispute resolution
process's mandate. In its legislative form, the World Trade Or-
ganization has latitude to deal with the myriad ways in which the
promotion of global free trade intersects with other global issues.
In its quasi-judicial form, however, its mandate is limited to review
of national laws and legal regimes.
17
Although limited, this mandate is far from trivial. Just as is
true of multinational legal regimes (and just as is true of local legal
regimes), national legal regimes often reflect underlying societal
values.' 8 Laws that do not comport with such underlying societal
values are generally perceived not to be legitimate and tend to be
either short-lived or disregarded.19 Every country maintains a set
of these societal values, of which free trade is only one.20 Countries
continually engage in evaluative or balancing processes when co-
ordinating these societal values, and the value of free trade is not
always preeminent.21 By contrast, the GATT consistently 22 pre-
ferred free trade to expressions of other values.23  Under the
16 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 700.
17 The World Trade Organization could, of course, reach multinational
agreements by reviewing a nation's implementing legislation of a particular
treaty. It is interesting to note that while scholarly commentators argued that en-
vironmental treaties such as the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species or the Montreal Protocol did in fact violate the General Agreement,
see, e.g., Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environ-
mental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397, 450-59 (1993), the ques-
tion never came before a GATT panel. This reflects either great prudence or great
fortune on the part of the GATT.
18 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 670.
19 See id. at 671-72. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "The first requirement
of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and
demands of the community, whether right or wrong." OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 41 (1881).
20 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 702-05.
21 Various countries restrain trade not for economic reasons but because the
prohibited or restrained item violates some belief or value of the prohibiting coun-
try. Examples include France's restriction of U.S. movies, Saudi Arabia's restric-
tion of pornography, or the U.S. restriction of narcotics. See, e.g., id. at 703-04.
22 But this practice was not without exception. For example, the General
Agreement itself contained a list of exceptions in Article 20, which included legis-
lation or action which was necessary to protect public morals or human, plant, or
animal life, which related to prison labor, or which was imposed to protect na-
tional treasures. See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 262.
23 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 700-02.
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GATT's more mediative dispute resolution process, in which panel
decisions were subject to the review of all of the parties to the
GATT, this institutional bias to some extent could be ameliorated. 24
The rigidity of the dispute resolution process in the World
Trade Organization, however, presents a special danger. To the
extent that the World Trade Organization forces countries to re-
form their laws so as to exalt the value of free trade over other val-
ues, the empirical legitimacy of national laws could be eroded.25
Countries asked to choose between obedience to the World Trade
Organization and having empirically legitimate laws may choose
to ignore the World Trade Organization.26
The compliance of member countries is critical to the efficacy of
the World Trade Organization. Unlike the International Labour
Organization, for example, which extends membership to unions
and special interest groups, 27 or INTELSAT, which is composed of
quasi-commercial agencies, 28 the World Trade Organization mem-
bership is comprised solely of countries.29 In the absence of any
coercive power with which to enforce its rules, the World Trade
Organization ultimately depends upon the voluntary compliance
of its members.30
24 In the entire history of the GATT, it was necessary only one time for the
parties to authorize a complaining country to undertake compensatory measures
for the violative acts of another party. See Netherlands, Measures of Suspension of
Obligations to the United States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT BISD 1st Supp. 32 (1953); see
also ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
191-98 (2d ed. 1990) (explicating to the Netherlands Action initiated in response to
U.S. restrictions on dairy imports).
25 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 707.
26 See id.
27 See Nicolas Valticos, International Labour Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 29 (Roger Blanpain
ed., 1983 & supps.).
28 See Nicolas M. Matte, Institutional Arrangements for International Space Ac-
tivities, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 97, 99-100 (Nandasiri Jasentuli-
yana ed., 1992) (INTELSAT is "an international organization and an international
enterprise, operating on a commercial basis and as a public utility service").
29 Membership will also be extended to any "separate customs territory pos-
sessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations." Char-
ter, supra note 6, art. XXII(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1150. Hong Kong, for example, will join
the World Trade Organization as a member rather than as part of the People's
Republic of China.
30 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 708; see also ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION 73-74 (1989) (stating that defiance of any treaty creates a risk that
the cooperative structure built around that treaty will collapse); Guy de Jon-
quires, Dreams Behind the Scenes, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at 11 (asserting that if the
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Thus it is critical to the survival of the free trade regime that the
World Trade Organization adopt an exception that will accommo-
date societal values. The appropriate exception would state that
laws primarily codifying an underlying societal value and only in-
cidentally hindering free trade should not be subject to World
Trade Organization scrutiny.31 This exception to World Trade Or-
ganization scrutiny could be enacted by the legislative body of the
World Trade Organization 32 or, more likely, fashioned as a doc-
trine by the Dispute Settlement Body or the Appellate Body.
33
While administration of this exception would require an inquiry
into the motive for the creation of a law, such inquiries are rou-
tinely undertaken by both domestic and international tribunals.
34
Indeed, evidence of societal values would be similar to evidence of
custom, which is a source of international law, and evidence of
which is often parsed by international tribunals.35 Placing a real
World Trade Organization's "'authority is once eroded by a big trading power,
that will be the end of the [World Trade Organization]') (quoting "a senior trade
official").
31 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 708.
32 See id. at 709-11.
33 See id. at 712-13; see also Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming May 1996) (discussing creation of doctrine by GATT dispute panels).
34 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 714-16. Courts in the United States have been
required to inquire as to legislative purpose when considering legislation relating
to bills of attainder, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Commerce Clause. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 11.7, 15.9(c), 18.4, 20.49 (2d
ed. 1992). Similarly, the European Court of Justice inquires into legislative pur-
pose. See, e.g., Case C-312/89, Union Departementale des Syndicats CGT de
L'Aisne v. SIDEF Conforma and Others, 3 C.M.L.R 746, 759 (1993) (requiring re-
view into purpose); Nichols, supra note 10, at 715. GATT panels themselves exam-
ined the legislative purpose behind laws. See e.g., United States, Measures Affect-
ing Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT BISD 39th Supp. 206, 276-77 (1993)
(conducting an inquiry into whether a law was passed for protectionist purposes
or for the purpose of effecting a legitimate regulatory goal).
35 To constitute custom, a country's behavior must not only consist of a gen-
eral practice, it must also be accepted by that country as obligatory. See Statute of
the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3
Bevans 1153, 1187. Thus, a court that is ascertaining the existence of custom must
ascertain the beliefs and values of a sovereign and a society. Evidence that is
parsed by the courts include diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press
releases, opinions of official legal advisors, policy manuals, executive practices,
comments by government officials, domestic legislation, and patterns of behavior.
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 1990). It
should be noted that GATT panels were no strangers to this type of evidence. See,
e.g., Norway, Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, June 22, 1989, GATT
BISD 36th Supp. 306, 321 (1990) (reviewing series of Norwegian legislative ac-
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burden of proof on the party claiming the exception, rather than
simply allowing that party to claim the exception, would mitigate
the possibility that this exception would be used as a pretext for
the enactment of protectionist laws.36
This argument has been criticized as not going far enough.
Professor Richard Shell, in a recently published article of his own,
damns the value-based argument for World Trade Organization
restraint with faint praise and endorses a theoretical model he calls
the "Trade Stakeholder Model." 37 Shell's model, in its simplest
form, argues for "broad participation in trade dispute resolution
for all parties with a stake in trade policy, not just commercial par-
ties."38 Although Shell is admittedly vague about how such par-
ticipation should occur, his discussion and examples point to an
expansion of the universe of parties with standing before World
Trade Organization dispute panels, thus allowing private parties,
as well as governments, to argue before those tribunals.39
While Professor Shell's contribution to the understanding of
the role of trade in the social edifice is extremely valuable, his ar-
gument for the expansion of standing must be viewed with cau-
tions).
36 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 716-17. In the context of judicial inquiry into
legislative purpose in the United States, Paul Brest has noted that supposed prob-
lems in ascertainability of purpose are largely illusory, and that both circumstan-
tial and direct evidence often exist to explain the motivations of lawmakers. See
Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problems of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 120-24. He also argues that the occasional
impossibility of determining motive "does not justify a blanket refusal to under-
take the inquiry if a decisionmaker's motivation can sometimes be determined
with adequate certainty." Id. at 120. Moreover, placing the burden on the party
claiming the exception would mean that when it could not be determined with a
degree of certainty whether or not a law actually expressed an underlying societal
value, the exception would not apply.
It is, of course, slightly possible that protectionist laws occasionally would es-
cape World Trade Organization scrutiny by means of this exception. If, however,
systems of governance and legal regimes were held to a standard of absolute perfec-
tion, then systems of governance and legal regimes would cease to exist. The argu-
ment is not that the proposed exception is flawless; rather, the argument is that a
system of trade governance that accommodates national expressions of societal val-
ues is superior to a system of trade governance that does not.
37 See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 921 (1995).
38 Id. at 911.
39 For example, Shell points to the influence of workers' and employers' or-
ganizations on the International Labour Organization. See id. at 916. He uses as
another example the European Union, which extends standing to individual citi-
zens in many areas. See id. at 918.
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tion. It is possible that his argument is based on implicit assump-
tions that do not comport with reality. Moreover, expansion of
standing might erode many of the gains made over the past fifty
years by countries working within the GATT. This essay examines
the assumptions implicit in the argument to expand standing, ex-
plains why those assumptions are unsound, and poses the argu-
ment against expansion of standing. As a superior alternative to
expansion of standing, this essay suggests changing the composi-
tion of dispute settlement panels. Before undertaking this analysis,
however, this essay briefly discusses the nature of the World Trade
Organization, in order to emphasize that the change being dis-
cussed - an extension of standing to nongovernment parties -
would be a fundamental change to the World Trade Organization
rather than a simple procedural modification.
2. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IS AN ORGANIZATION OF
NATIONS
Providing standing to nongovernment entities is not a simple
procedural change; rather, it goes to the very essence of the GATT
and the World Trade Organization -entities conceived of and de-
signed as forums in which governments, not private parties, for-
mulate trade policy. This emphasis on governmental interaction
can be demonstrated both historically and operationally.
The GATT - which endured for almost fifty years - was an or-
phan of the proposed International Trade Organization. 40 In turn,
40 The General Agreement was pieced together as a stopgap measure to
bridge the period between the end of negotiations among the industrialized na-
tions and the ratification of the International Trade Organization charter by those
nations. Thus, the General Agreement was never conceived of as a treaty, but was
instead an agreement acceded to through a Protocol of Provisional Application.
Moreover, the negotiating power that Congress conferred upon the United States
executive branch regarding this temporary measure specifically excluded any ref-
erence to an international organization. In fact, all references to an international
organization were deleted from the General Agreement. The United States Senate
eventually failed, because of sovereignty concerns, to ratify creation of the Inter-
national Trade Organization. The "temporary" General Agreement became the
means to regulate international trade policy for the ensuing fifty years. For excel-
lent histories of the General Agreement and its evolution into the foremost inter-
national trading body, see ROBERT E. HUDEc, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD
TRADE DIPLOMACY 49-52 (2d ed. 1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT 36-53 (1969).
Interestingly, one of the reasons that the negotiators of the International Trade
Organization felt a need for an interim agreement was to protect the delicate bar-
gain that had been struck from the influences of special interest groups. William
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the International Trade Organization was to serve as the third leg
of a global economic tripod forged at Bretton Woods in the waning
years of World War 11.41 Although the U.S. Congress killed the In-
ternational Trade Organization, 42 the other two legs -the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (better known as the World Bank)- became
principal actors in the global economic order.43 Most notably, the
Bretton Woods negotiations were conducted at the highest levels of
government and involved critical issues regarding the sovereignty
of those nations.44 Even today, the International Monetary Fund
limits membership to sovereign countries; member governments
appoint its managers; and only governments receive lending assis-
tance.45 Similarly, sovereign nations own the World Bank; those
nations that manage the Bank appoint the governors; and the Bank
makes or arranges for loans only to governments or government
related entities.4
6
Diebold, who has been closely involved in trade negotiations, reports that "I was
told that Will Clayton said that 'we need to act before the vested interests get their
vests on.' Whether he really said that, I don't know, but it makes the point." Wil-
liam Diebold, Reflections on the International Trade Organization, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
335, 336 (1994).
41 See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order
for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 352 (1995) (discussing "the three legs
upon which the new multilateral economic system should rest"). Interestingly,
Peter Sutherland, the first Director-General of the World Trade Organization, has
spoken of the World Trade Organization as one of the Bretton Woods institutions,
even though it was created in 1995, almost fifty years after the two other Bretton
Woods institutions. See Peter Sutherland, Open For Trade: The First Three Months of
the WTO, Focus: WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION NEWSLETTER (Info. & Media Rela-
tions Div. of the WTO, Geneva), Mar.-Apr., 1995, at 12, 13.
42 See Ruth E. Olson, GATT- Legal Application of Safeguards in the Context of
Regional Trade Arrangements and Its Implications for the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1488, 1491 (1989) ("When the United States
Congress failed to ratify the International Trade Organization, the negotiating
countries reverted to the GATI as an existing legal framework.") (footnote omit-
ted).
43 A full history of the Bretton Woods negotiations, while fascinating, is be-
yond the scope of this essay. For a truly interesting historical treatment, see
ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETrON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM (1978)
(tracing the history of the Bretton Woods system, including its success and fail-
ure).
44 See id. at 168-223.
45 See 4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL SERIES, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FuND xiii-xvi (Anne C.M. Salda ed., 1992).
46 See BAREND A. DE VRIES, REMAKING THE WORLD BANK 8-10 (1987). The IMF
and the World Bank have been the subject of their share of criticism. Interest-
[Vol. 25:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss2/6
EXTENSION OF STANDING
The World Trade Organization is the culmination of eight years
of multinational negotiations.47 The Uruguay Round negotiations,
like those at Bretton Woods, took place at the intergovernmental
level. The participating countries, however, did solicit comments
from business, other nongovernmental entities, and the public in
general. For example, a variety of U.S. agencies -including the
United States Trade Representative, the Department of State, the
Department of Commerce, and the International Trade Commis-
sion- solicited public comments on issues such as environmental
implications of the Uruguay Round,48 the impact of the Uruguay
Round on various industries, 49 the integration of various industries
into the GATT,50 and the reduction or elimination of tariffs on par-
ticular goods.5' Congress, which does not have negotiating pow-
ingly, that criticism includes lack of transparency and democracy as well as lack of
independent appeals for private groups affected by IMF and World Bank activity.
See John Cavanaugh et al., Introduction: From Bretton Woods to Chiapas, in BEYOND
BRETrON WOODS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER xii, xv (John
Cavanaugh et al. eds., 1994).
47 These negotiations -launched on September 20, 1986, in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, substantially concluded on December 15, 1993, and formally concluded
in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994-are cumulatively referred to as the
"Uruguay Round" of multilateral negotiations. See JEFFREY J. SCHOTF & JOHANNA
W. BUURMAN, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 3 (1994). For a thorough his-
tory of the negotiations between 1986 and 1992, see THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND:
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
48 See, e.g., United States Trade Representative, Report on Environmental Is-
sues in the Uruguay Round Agreements, 59 Fed. Reg. 9802 (1994) (announcing
notice and request for public comment).
49 See, e.g., International Trade Commission, Potential Impact on the U.S.
Economy and Industries of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements, 59 Fed. Reg.
15218 (1994) (announcing the institution of an investigation of and calling for pub-
lic submissions on the Uruguay Round's effect on various sectors of the national
economy); Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration, Comprehensive Examination of U.S. Regulation of Interna-
tional Telecommunications Services, 58 Fed. Reg. 4846 (1993) (announcing notice
of inquiry and request for comments); International Trade Commission, Probable
Economic Effect of Multilateral Removal of Trade Barriers on Imports of Sugar,
Meat, Peanuts, Cotton, and Dairy Products, 55 Fed. Reg. 28467 (1990) (announcing
institution of investigation and notice of hearing).
50 See, e.g., Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, Request
for Public Comments on the Integration of the Textiles and Clothing Sector into
the GATT! 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 26212 (1994) (requesting information of the ramifica-
tions of integrating textiles into the Uruguay Round Agreements); Department of
Commerce, International Trade Administration Exporters' Textile Advisory
Committee, Open Meeting, 55 Fed. Reg. 49099 (1990) (discussing Uruguay Round
negotiations).
51 See, e.g., Department of State, Advisory Committee on International In-
vestment, Meeting, 56 Fed. Reg. 43832 (1991) (announcing notice of meeting); Of-
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ers, also actively solicited public comment52 and promulgated its
own views.53 Other major trading countries elicited public input in
a similar manner. In Canada, for example, the Department of Fi-
nance, the International Trade Tribunal, and the Department of Ex-
ternal Affairs and International Trade each held public hearings on
trade negotiations. 54 Established trading nations were not alone in
receiving public input. Emerging economies also utilized various
methods of obtaining inputs from entities outside of the govern-
ment.55
Nonetheless, although governments paid heed to the com-
ments and concerns of private entities, the actual Uruguay Round
negotiations were undertaken by and among governments, and
not by the citizens whom those governments represent.5 6
fice of the United States Trade Representative, Uruguay Round Negotiations on
Tariff and Non-Tariff Measures, 54 Fed. Reg. 38311 (1989) (announcing notice of
public hearings and request for written comments); International Trade Commis-
sion, Intent to Hold MTN Field Hearings, 53 Fed. Reg. 47589 (1988) (announcing
notice of intent to hold hearings); Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tive, Trade Policy Staff Committee, Articles Being Considered for Possible Duty
Removal, 53 Fed. Reg. 30920 (1986) (announcing notice and schedule of public
hearings).
52 See, e.g., Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1993) (reprinting a press release announcing hearings).
53 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 64, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 4 (1991) (stating that
U.S. negotiators must address "environmental concerns, health and safety stan-
dards, labor and industry adjustment... and worker rights").
54 See, e.g., Department of Finance, Invitation to Submit Comments on Pro-
posed Tariff Reductions on Manufacturing Inputs, 128 C. Gaz. 2790 (pt. I 1994)
(inviting public comment on proposed tariff reductions); Canadian International
Trade Tribunal, Competitiveness of the Canadian Cattle and Beef Industries, 126
C. Gaz. 3681 (pt. I 1992) (announcing notice of public hearings); see also External
Affairs and International Trade Canada, North American Free Trade Negotia-
tions, 125 C. Gaz. 2698 (pt. I 1991) (noting in its solicitation of comments that the
International Trade Advisory Group on International Trade provided advice on
Uruguay Round negotiations).
55 See, e.g., Ashok V. Desai, The Politics of India's Trade Policy, in DoMESTIc
POLITICS AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 91, 96-102 (Henry R. Nau ed., 1989) (noting
that while India's trade agreements are negotiated by elected officials, many
groups, including consumers, have inputs); J. Ray Kennedy & Roberto Giannetti
da Fonseca, Brazilian Trade Policy and the Uruguay Round, in id. at 29, 40-42 (stating
that industry, trading companies, and agriculture "have some influence over gov-
ernment decisions" regarding the Uruguay Round); Kim Kihwan & Chung Hwa
Soo, Korea's Domestic Trade Politics and the Uruguay Round, in id. at 135, 145
(" [N]ongovermnental actors have considerable access to the core of the trade poli-
cyrnaking system, the executive branch. They can present their case to officials
from the relevant ministry, both formally and informally, and at various levels.").
56 See generally Arthur Dunkel, 'Trade Policies for a Better Future' and the Uru-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss2/6
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Given the results of these negotiations, Professor Shell's focus
on dispute resolution is understandable.5 7 The World Trade Or-
ganization will perform at least three functions: surveillance of
guay Round, in TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE: THE 'LEUTWILER REPORT,' THE
GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 1, 1 (1987) (describing the Uruguay Round as
"the most far-reaching, comprehensive and significant multilateral trade negotia-
tion ever undertaken" and noting that "the magnitude of this enterprise will pose
a formidable challenge to the participants in terms of their imagination, farsight-
edness and political will").
57 In fairness, it should be noted that Shell also suggests that nongovernmen-
tal parties should play a role in policymaking. See Shell, supra note 37, at 922.
Such, however, is already the case. Although countries will not allow others to
bargain in their place, the GATI, almost since its inception, worked closely with,
consulted, and even considered motions by international nongovernmental or-
ganizations such as the United Nations, the IMF, and the International Chamber
of Commerce ("ICC"). See, e.g., Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT
BISD 39th Supp. 448, 448 (1993) (stating "seven international organizations are in-
vited to attend meetings of the Committee in an observer capacity"); Committee
on Customs Valuation, GATT BISD 39th Supp. 396, 396 (1993) (listing representa-
tives of four countries that are not parties to the GATT but which do attend meet-
ings, as do the Customs Co-operation Council, the IMF, and UNCTAD); Report
(1981) of the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT BISD 28th Supp. 34,
34 (1982) (stating that IMF, UNCTAD, ISO, IEC, and FAO/WHO attend meet-
ings); Italian Import Deposit, Report of the Working Party, Oct. 21, 1971, GATT
BISD 21st Supp. 121, 122 (1975) (thanking the representatives of the IMF for the
"statement on Italy's balance of payments and measures taken to restore equilib-
rium in the country's economy and external position"); International Trade Centre
UNCTAD/GATT, Report of the Joint Advisory Group, Nov. 25, 1968, GATT BISD
16th Supp. 98, 98 (1969) (stating that "experts and advisers in the field of trade in-
formation and trade promotion from a large number of countries and inter-
governmental organizations participated in the meeting"); Trade and Customs
Regulations: Certificates of Origin, Marks of Origin, Consular Formalities, Nov.
17, 1956, GATT BISD 5th Supp. 102, 102 (1957) (stating that a working party con-
siders proposals from the ICC); Customs Administration: Nationality of Imported
Goods, Oct. 23, 1953, GATT BISD 2d Supp. 53, 53-54 (1954) (noting that parties to
the GATT vote on a motion submitted by the ICC); Balance-of-Payments Quanta-
tive Restrictions: Consultation Procedure Under Article XII:4(a), June 20, 1949, 2
GATT BISD 89, 93 (1952) (stating "consultations under paragraph 4(a) of Article
XII involve very close co-operation with the International Monetary Fund").
The World Trade Organization appears to continue this practice. The charter of
the World Trade Organization states that "[t]he General Council shall make appro-
priate arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental organi-
zations that have responsibilities related to those" undertaken by the World Trade
Organization. Charter, supra note 6, art. V(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1146. The charter goes on
to state that the World Trade Organization may also "make appropriate arrange-
ments for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations." Id.
art. V(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1146. Although it is probable that some fine tuning could oc-
cur in these arrangements, structurally the door has been opened. The real, and sig-
nificant, change that Shell calls for is the expansion of standing to include nongov-
ernment parties.
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member countries' trade policies; 58 negotiation of substantive in-
ternational trade policies and regulations; 59 and resolution of dis-
putes between members concerning those trade policies. 60 Review
of trade policy occupies a low-profile position in debate over trade
regulation. On the other hand, because negotiating trade policy
inherently involves a yielding of sovereignty, 61 it is unlikely that
member countries would be willing to entrust negotiations involv-
ing sovereignty to any entity other than themselves. Thus, only
dispute resolution remains as an area for nongovernment party in-
volvement. Moreover, dispute resolution is the most visible point
of contact between private parties and the functioning of the World
Trade Organization and thus is a significant area of concern for the
stakeholder proposal.
The creation of the World Trade Organization effected a sig-
nificant change in the nature of dispute resolution. Since 1955,
disputes between countries that cannot be resolved through con-
sultation have been referred to dispute panels. 62 Panels receive
submissions and hear arguments both from representatives of the
disputing governments and from interested third party countries.
63
The panel then rules on the applicability of the appropriate trade
agreement to the dispute and recommends what action the GATT
58 The primary mechanism of surveillance is the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism. See Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, reprinted in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, THE LEGAL TEXTS Annex
3 (1994) [hereinafter LEGAL TEXTS]. Trade policy review was previously conducted
pursuant to a Decision by parties to the GATT. See Functioning of the GATT Sys-
tem, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT BISD 36th Supp. 403, 405 (1990).
59 Two legislative bodies -the Ministerial Conference which meets at least
every two years and the General Council which meets at all times in between -
carry out the functions of the World Trade Organization. See Charter, supra note
6, art. IV, 33 I.L.M. at 1145. One function of the legislative bodies will be to "pro-
vide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral
trade relations." Id. art. 111(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1145; see also Nichols, supra note 10, at
691-93 (discussing the policymaking role of the WTO); Patterson & Patterson, su-
pra note 3, at 42 (discussing legislative process in the World Trade Organization).
60 See supra note 7; infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
61 See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congru-
ence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1232-33 (1992) ("Issues formerly
thought to be well within the exclusive terrain of national sovereignties, such as
exchange rates and taxing policies, now must be examined for their impact on
trade liberalization or barriers.").
62 See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 63 (1990) (discuss-
ing the arbitration-oriented process utilized by GATT dispute panels since 1955).
63 See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 10-12, 33 I.L.M. at 1232-34.
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or World Trade Organization should take.64 Within the GATT,
dispute resolution was a mediative process.65 Dispute panel deci-
sions became final only after the parties to the GATT adopted them
by consensus. Since consensus requires an absence of negative
votes, any country - even the party losing before a panel - could
veto a panel ruling.66 This dynamic explicitly encouraged political
accommodation.
67
The dispute resolution process under the World Trade
Organization reverses the process of decision adoption. Panel
decisions - or appellate decisions 68 - will automatically be adopted
unless all of the votes are against adoption.69 In other words,
whereas under the GATT system the sole vote of the losing party
could prevent adoption of a panel decision, under the World Trade
Organization system the sole vote of the winning party can force
adoption. It cannot, however, be argued that this dramatic change
indicates that governments are no longer concerned with the
dispute settlement process. If anything, the additional weight
placed upon panel reports makes the dispute settlement process
even more critical to the functioning of the World Trade
Organization and to the substantive rights of member nations.70
64 See HUDEC, supra note 40, at 92; JACKSON, supra note 40, at 63; Rosine Plank,
An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Not, J. INT'L ARB.,
Dec. 1987, at 53.
65 See JACKSON, supra note 40, at 65 n.5.
66 See id. at 65. "Consensus comes close to [but is not] unanimity. It is, rather,
a state of non-objection, a resigned let-it-go." Pierre Pescatore, The GATT Dispute
Settlement Mechanism: Its Present Situation and Its Prospects, J. INT'L ARB., Mar. 1993,
at 35.
67 See Fred L. Morrison, The Future of International Adjudication, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 827, 838 (1991) ("The relative success of the GATT mechanism has been be-
cause of, not in spite of, its recognition of a political role in the process."). Fre-
quently, the result of this mediative process was palatable to both disputing coun-
tries. See Plank, supra note 64, at 88-92 (describing how contracting parties act on
a panel report).
68 The Understanding on dispute resolution provides the right to an appeal
before an appellate board of trade judges. See Understanding, supra note 7, art. 17,
33 I.L.M. at 1236.
69 See id. art. 16, 33 I.L.M. at 1235; Nichols, supra note 10, at 700.
70 Indeed, the United States has proposed a five-judge panel that will review
decisions against the United States. If, within a five year period, these judges de-
termine that three negative decisions exceed the scope or authority of the World
Trade Organization, then Congress will consider a resolution to withdraw from
the World Trade Organization altogether. See S. Res. 16, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act),
141 CONG. REC. S176, S176 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995); see also Terry Atlas, Job Worries at
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The fact that the World Trade Organization is an organization
of nations, and that dispute resolution has been and will continue
to be a process among nations, does not necessarily mean that ex-
pansion of standing to include nongovemment entities is a bad
idea. It does mean that expansion of standing is more than a mere
procedural change, and is a suggestion that should be neither
lightly made nor blithely taken. Indeed, expansion of standing
presents several issues that demand close scrutiny and careful
thought.
3. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENCIES
Professor Shell's suggestion of expanding standing beyond
member nations implicitly assumes that national governments do
not adequately represent the interests of all of their constituencies.
The capacity of democratic governments to represent the values of
their constituencies is especially pertinent to a discussion about
trade disputes because the bulk of world trade, and therefore the
majority of trade disputes, 71 occurs between democratic countries.72
There is much anecdotal criticism of government.73 From a
more disciplined and analytical perspective, political theory also
teaches that democratic institutions are not perfect.74 There is little
consensus on what democracy is,75 how the process works,76 or
Root of GATT Fears; Many Prefer Security of Present to Future Potential, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 7, 1994, at C1 (describing the panel).
71 See Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of the GATT Dispute Settlement
Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 29-30 (1993) (reporting that only 17 of
207 cases did not involve either the United States or European Union nations).
72 See Democracy and Growth: Why Voting is Good for You, ECONOMisT, Aug. 27,
1994, at 15 (stating that "nearly all of the world's richest countries are... democ-
ratic"); see also John F. Helliwell, Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Eco-
nomic Growth, 24 BRr. J. POL. Sci. 225, 233-35 (1994) (finding a significant correla-
tion between national wealth and democracy, and a positive effect of increased
income on democracy).
73 See virtually any statement by virtually any opposition candidate in virtu-
ally any election year.
74 See, e.g., Phillipe C. Schmitter, Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy, J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1994, at 57, 62-63 (listing problems with democratic institutions,
including oligarchic nonaccountability, free riding, policy recycling, nonaccount-
able necessary institutions, and transnational interdependence).
75 See GIOvANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 257-75 (1987)
(devoting 18 pages to not answering the question of what democracy is).
76 See Charles R. Beitz, Procedural Equality in Democratic Theory: A Preliminary
Examination, in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: NOMOS XXV 69 U. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1983) (arguing that different commentators have various opinions
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which of the various democratic models is most effective. 77 None-
theless, the mainstream consensus is that democratic governments
do function to fairly assess, evaluate, and coordinate various socie-
tal values and goals.78 This is true of trade policy as well.
79
The fact that existing democratic institutions are not perfect al-
lows for some refinement of the assumption underlying Shell's
suggestion. Professor Shell's suggestion could be ascribed not to
an implicit assumption that governments do not balance values,
but instead to an assumption that the World Trade Organization
will do so more effectively, and therefore the governed should in-
dicate their preferences directly to the World Trade Organization.
Indeed, Shell hints that this is his assumption when he character-
izes his model as "participatory governance," in contrast to the
World Trade Organization's use of representative democracy.
80
Scholars of democratic theory, however, argue that participa-
tory governance is impossible on a global scale. Robert Dahl
points out the fundamental paradox of the large political systems
on the specific procedures required in a political system in order for a country to
be considered a "democracy").
77 See, e.g., Kaare Strom, Democracy as Political Competition, in REEXAMINING
DEMOCRACY 27, 28, 34 (Garry Mark & Larry Diamond eds., 1992) (describing a de-
bate among Seymour Martin Lipset, who argues that effective democracy is a
competition for political office, Crawford Macpherson, who argues that democ-
racy is oligopolistic, and Jane Mansbridge, who argues that democracy is adver-
sarial).
78 See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 106-18 (1989) (discussing
the distinctive characteristics of a democratic process of government through an
analysis of the assumptions and criteria of a democratic political order); SEYMOUR
MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN 27 (expanded ed., 1981) (stating that a democracy
without an underlying value system will result in chaos); J. ROLAND PENNOCK,
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 159 (1979) (stating that "democracy tends to
'maximize' the values of liberty and equality and ... respect for persons").
79 After an exhaustive study of the relationship between democracy and
trade policy, Daniel Verdier concludes:
Voters control policymaking because elections provide policymakers
with incentives to reproduce within their institutional microcosms the
parametric structure of the electorate. Voters signal to their elected rep-
resentatives the balance between particular and general goals that they
wish to see struck by the legislative process. Voter control is indirect,
since voters do not choose the outcome; rather, they create the incentive
structure that motivates politicians to legislate in accordance with voter
concerns. In short, if electors do not necessarily choose policies, they do
choose the decision rules by which lawmakers make policies.
DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 290 (1994).
80 See Shell, supra note 37, at 914.
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necessary to deal with transnational problems:
In very small political systems a citizen may be able to
participate extensively in decisions that do not matter much
but cannot participate much in decisions that really matter
a great deal; whereas very large systems may be able to
cope with problems that matter more to a citizen, the op-
portunities for the citizen to participate in and greatly in-
fluence decisions are vastly reduced.81
Although it is beyond peradventure that the World Trade Or-
ganization will be required to balance interests that affect the entire
world, it is difficult to envisage a scheme that could equitably al-
low for direct participation by all of the citizens of the world.
Moreover, on a purely empirical level, the policy of subsidiarity in
the European Union,82 and the appeal of "states' rights" rhetoric in
the United States, 83 indicate a popular desire to keep value balanc-
ing as close to local levels as possible.
The best case for Professor Shell's assumptions lies with non-
democratic members of the World Trade Organization. While
these countries are not involved in a significant number of trade
disputes, they should not be ignored, particularly given the likeli-
hood that the People's Republic of China will become a member of
the World Trade Organization.8 4 It is possible that in nondemoc-
81 Robert A. Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen
Participation, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 23, 28 (1994).
82 Subsidiarity is the policy of handling issues such as taxation, regulation,
and providing public security at a local decentralized level of government. See
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH, MAKING SENSE OF SUBSIDIARITY: How
MUCH CENTRALIZATION FOR EUROPE? 3-4, 19-23 (1993); George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994) (explaining and analyzing the strengths and weaknesses
of the principle of subsidiarity and concluding that "it 'fits' the European Com-
munity at its present juncture").
83 See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Senate Votes to Repeal Helmet Laws, WASH. POST, June
22, 1995, at Al (discussing the Senate's continued efforts to take power from the
federal government and give it to the states).
84 See Tony Walker, Survey of China, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, at 3 (discussing
China's progress in gaining World Trade Organization membership). But see
Knock, Knock, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at 72 (indicating that although China has
"made much progress in the past year or so" there are still problematic issues,
such as human rights and intellectual property protection, that block its entry into
the World Trade Organization).
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ratic countries certain constituencies are not allowed a voice in the
balancing of values.85 To the extent that this is true, however, the
same factors that preclude those constituencies from participation
at the national level will also preclude participation at the interna-
tional level. It is unlikely, for example, that a group of human
rights activists would be allowed to leave Burma to participate in a
proceeding in Geneva, or, having somehow done so, would find a
comfortable reception waiting at home.
86
Proponents of expanded standing may counter that, because
constituencies in nondemocratic regimes cannot speak for them-
selves, the need to allow somebody else to speak for them is espe-
cially critical. This, however, already occurs within the existing
system. For example, both France and the United States have pro-
posed that the World Trade Organization consider labor rights.
87
The rights of groups with little power, such as children and forced
laborers, are of special concern to the two countries.88 Part of the
impetus for this concern is the desire to protect high paying jobs in
democratic countries. Part of the impetus for this concern is the al-
truistic belief that some practices are morally wrong.89 But regard-
less of the impetus, the governments of France and the United
85 It is only possible, not certain, that nondemocratic countries exclude con-
stituencies from the value balancing process. Even nondemocratic regimes tend
to represent their constituencies to some degree, particularly when such regimes
wish to be considered legitimate. See J. Roland Pennock, Political Representation:
An Overview, in REPRESENTATION: NOMOS X 3, 6-8 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1968) ("All regimes obtain legitimacy by being in some degree
representative or at least convincing their subjects that they are.").
86 See Ted Bardacke, Red Cross Office in Burma to Shut, FIN. TIMES, June 20,
1995, at 10 ("[T]he Burmese government has become less sensitive to international
complaints about human rights conditions in the country, as foreign invest-
ment... has poured in."); Philip Shenon, Burma Unlikely to Free Dissident When
Detention Term Ends, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1995, at A3 (reporting that Burma threat-
ens to keep human rights activist imprisoned indefinitely); James Strachan, How to
Spend It: The Dark Side of the Sun, FIN. TIMES, June 10, 1995, at VI (describing use of
political and other prisoners as human minesweepers). Burma was a party to the
General Agreement, see GATT 1947, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A8, 55 U.N.T.S. at 188,
and is a signatory to the World Trade Organization charter, see Final Act, supra
note 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1131.
87 See Bhushan Bahree, U.S. Renews Controversial Bid to Tie Labor Principles to
Trade Privileges, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1995, at A9 (discussing U.S. attempts to link
labor standards with world trade privileges); Guy de Jonquires & Robert Taylor,
France to Push Workers' Rights in VVTO, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at 4 (reporting
France's effort to encourage members of the EU to "link workers' rights and la-
bour standards with the conduct of international trade").
88 See Bahree, supra note 87, at A9.
89 See id.
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States have synthesized and balanced a number of values in order
to arrive at their positions. Moreover, nontrade values that benefit
nonconstituents are represented, through governments, at the
World Trade Organization.
4. PLACING TRADE POLICY IN THE ADVERSARIAL ARENA
The expansion of standing not only belies the reality of how
trade policy is determined, but also could force the creation of
trade policy even further into the public consciousness. The result-
ing loss of its low profile might prove disastrous for free trade.
Several facts indicate the dangers that publicity may have upon
efforts to liberalize trade. First, although the overall economic ef-
fect is usually beneficial, liberalization of trade policy usually hurts
some constituency. 90 Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson iden-
tify the constituencies in a given economy that are most likely to be
harmed by trade liberalization.91 Ronald Rogowski, in turn, builds
upon this foundation a theory that predicts domestic responses to
various proposals for liberalized trade.92  Not surprisingly,
Rogowski also predicts that those constituencies likely to be
harmed by free trade will collaborate to oppose trade liberalization
at the national level.93 The rancorous debates over ratification of
the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay
Round support Rogowski's predictions.94 Indeed, the unusual po-
litical coalitions which opposed ratification of those agreements 95
90 See, e.g., Robert C. Shelburne & Robert W. Bednarzik, Geographic Concentra-
tion of Trade-Sensitive Employment, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1993, at 3, 10 (demon-
strating differing impacts of trade-related unemployment across geographic ar-
eas).
91 See Wolfgang F. Stolper & Paul A. Samuelson, Protection and Real Wages, 9
REV. ECON. STUD. 58, 72 (1941) (demonstrating that trade liberalization harms
owners and users of scarce factors and resources in a society).
92 See RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS: How TRADE AFFEcTS
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS 1-16, 163-64 (1989).
93 See id. at 4-5 (describing how "beneficiaries of change will try to continue
and accelerate [the domestic political process], while the victims of the same
change will endevour to retard or halt it... as the desire and the means for a par-
ticular political preference increase, the likelihood grows that political entrepre-
neurs will devise mechanisms that can surmount the obstacles to collective ac-
tion"); see also Charles K. Rowley & Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking and Trade
Protection, in PROTECTIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 141, 151-52 (Heinz
Hauser ed., 1986) (noting that trade protection results from political activity of
"losers" from free trade).
94 See Sol Mosher, The Politics of World Trade, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994, at 20.
95 See id. (describing the unusual coalition that opposed the North American
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indicate a shortcoming in Rogowski's analysis: he predicts opposi-
tion to free trade solely on economic grounds, whereas much of the
opposition actually stemmed from ideological sources. Whatever
the reason for a position, however, it is abundantly clear that sort-
ing out a national trade policy can be a contentious affair.
A second fact suggesting the harmful effect of thrusting trade
into the adversarial arena is that once trade policy determination
leaves the national arena, it tends to fall from public view. For ex-
ample, the passions within the United States that were generated
by the debate over the ratification of the North American Free
Trade Agreement were not fully replicated in the debate over rati-
fication of the Uruguay Round. 96 The actual functioning of the
World Trade Organization has generated even less interest than
the ratification of the Uruguay Round. Indeed, the negotiation of
trade regulations captures more attention than the adjudication of
disputes under those regulations.
97
With these two facts in mind - that trade liberalization will
usually harm some domestic constituencies and that attention to
trade policy declines after determination of trade policy leaves the
national arena -at least three problems can be predicted to arise if
standing expands to include nongovernment entities. First, expan-
sion of standing will undermine the apparent authority, and thus
the ability, of nations to negotiate trade policies. Trade negotiation
is one of the primary functions of the World Trade Organization.
98
Multilateral trade negotiations are, by their very nature, delicate
and time consuming processes. 99 Multilateral trade negotiations
are not like any other type of international negotiations; they are
made especially complicated by the Most Favored Nation princi-
ple, which requires that any concession granted to one country
must automatically extend to every other party.10° Because of this
Free Trade Agreement).
96 See Gerald F. Seib, Debate on GATT Recalls Nafta Battle in Many Ways, But the
Passion Is Gone, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1995, at A12 (noting that the "GATT debate
hasn't hit a Nafta-like fever pitch in the public arena").
97 See Richard N. Cooper, Trade Policy Is Foreign Policy, 9 FOREIGN POL'Y 18
(1972) (noting how international trade policy is considered "low foreign policy"
and receives little national attention).
98 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
99 See GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS 52-56 (1992) (describing the delicacy and complexity of trade agree-
ment negotiation).
100 The Most Favored Nation principle is defined in the General Agreement:
20041
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principle, negotiators are reluctant to proffer concessions, and
must evaluate whether the advantages gained by offering the con-
cession to one country are worth the loss in leverage over other
countries. 101 The Most Favored Nation requirement also causes
countries to be very reluctant to enter into negotiations unless the
delicate balances they achieve will be final. 02 Indeed, fast track
negotiating authority in the United States'0 3 is predicated upon the
notion that other countries are unlikely to negotiate unless the re-
sulting agreements are immune from congressional amendment. 0 4
Expansion of standing would undoubtedly lead to the spectacle
of domestic constituencies opposing the positions of the govern-
ments that are supposed to represent those constituencies. 05 The
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation.... any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded imme-
diately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. I(1), 61 Stat. at A12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196, 198.
101 See GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND
NEGOTIATION 62 (1986) (explaining the negotiating tactics of exchanging conces-
sions).
102 See id. at 58-90.
103 For a brief, but excellent, description of fast track negotiating authority,
see Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 143, 143-44 (1992). Fast track negotiating authority imposes limits on the
executive's scope of negotiating powers in exchange for an agreement by Con-
gress to severely curtail its ability to amend the resulting ratification agreement
and implementation legislation. See id. Far from limiting public input into the
negotiations, Koh argues that "[in the typical situation, the Executive Branch de-
velops an initial strategy for negotiating with our trading partners, but the
amended Fast Track process encourages the President to alter that strategy over
time through consultation with private industry groups and through dialogue
with a Congress." Id. at 165; see also Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, The Fast
Track Debate: A Prescription for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAW. 183, 184-86 (1992) (de-
scribing the U.S. fast track procedures and its applications).
104 See Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policy-
making After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1200-01 (1986)
(contending that congressional refusal to authorize advance negotiating authority
made trading partners reluctant to negotiate with the United States in the 1970s);
Koh, supra note 103, at 148 (explaining that fast track negotiating authority en-
hances presidential credibility).
105 It is not difficult to envision possible scenarios. The European Union, for
example, plans to ban the importation of furs taken from animals that were
caught in leg hold traps. See Caroline Southey, EU Warns of Fur Trap Ban, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1996, at 5. On the other hand, Wise Use, which consists of a group
of very well-monied environmental nongovernment organizations, vehemently
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss2/6
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outcomes of such clashes - and the impact of such clashes upon the
domestic politics of member counties-would be unpredictable.
Allowing private parties that were not successful when values and
goals were balanced at the national level to have standing before
dispute settlement parties would create an irreconcilable disso-
nance for countries engaged in the delicate process of trade nego-
tiation. Countries would face one position at the negotiating table
and another in tribunals. In turn, this would create uncertainty
about a country's true position and cause reluctance by trading
partners to negotiate with that country.
The second harm raised by the expansion of standing is ineq-
uity. Advocating a position in a domestic forum costs time, effort,
skill, and money. 106 Likewise, advocating a position in an interna-
tional forum is not free from significant costs. 1 07 Only those inter-
est groups whose resources were not exhausted at the domestic
level could take advantage of standing before the World Trade Or-
ganization. In other words, rather than resulting in a democratiza-
tion of trade policymaking, expansion of standing might instead be
opposes almost all environmentally friendly legislation. See Mary L. Gallagher,
Wise Use or Wise Marketing, PLANNING, Jan. 1996, at 4; Kevin Carmody, Environ-
mental Backlash- Big Bucks Behind It, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25, 1995, at F2. The
U.S. government also has indicated that it opposes the ban on importation of leg-
caught fur. See European Commission to Propose Delay in Banning Some Fur Imports
Until 1997, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1972 (Nov. 29, 1995). If the United States
changed its position and agreed to the legality of the ban, it would almost cer-
tainly ask for some concession in exchange. If standing were extended to nongov-
ernmental entities, it is likely that Wise Use would seek on its own, or would join
the action of another group seeking to have the ban ruled to be violative of a trade
agreement. If Wise Use was successful, the United States would nonetheless re-
tain the quid pro quo for its concession. This clash would appear at best to be a
coincidence and at worst to be collusive. In either case, the European Union
would be less likely to deal with the United States in the future.
This, of course, is but one example. As the World Trade Organization explores
the intersections between trade and other social values and goals, hundreds of is-
sues will arise on which governments will be required to take positions. To the ex-
tent that democracy works, these positions will reflect a consensus of or synthesis of
the values of citizens.
106 See Barbara A. Phillips & Anthony C. Piazza, The Role of Mediation in Public
Interest Disputes, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1231, 1242 (1983) (stating that public interest liti-
gation is costly and time consuming).
107 For example, advocating a position in the World Trade Organization dis-
pute resolution process includes the consultation, panel, interim panel review,
and appellate review stages. See Understanding, supra note 7, arts. 4, 6, 12, 15-17,
20, 33 I.L.M. at 1228-38. To complete this process, no less than hundreds of hours
of skilled advocates are needed over the course of an entire year, at the bare
mnimum.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
a boon to a select group of well-monied interest groups.
Determining which constituencies could appear before a panel
adjudicating a dispute also raises questions of equity. The envi-
ronmental movement provides a good example of the difficulties
created by expanded standing. Although a precise numerical
count is impossible, the United States alone is home to literally
thousands of groups with environmental orientations. 08 Similarly,
hundreds, if not thousands, of international nongovernmental or-
ganizations and nationally based nongovernmental organizations
deal with environmental issues at the international level.' 09 Believ-
ing that any one of these environmental groups could speak for all
of them would display a profound ignorance of the environmental
movement. In the rawest of terms, significant differences exist be-
tween recreationalists, conservationists, and preservationists" 0 At
the same time, a trade dispute panel cannot possibly hear from
thousands of groups. The process of winnowing down this list to a
manageable group of parties will involve normative and evaluative
decisions that will be, at best, judgmental and, at worst, arbi-
trary."'
Finally, and most seriously, expansion of standing might cause
the World Trade Organization to move away from, or be unable to
pursue, the goal of free trade. It can be argued that the low public
profile of international trade policy has been one of the largest con-
tributors to trade liberalization over the past fifty years. Although
trade liberalization usually increases aggregate welfare, it must
survive a serious gauntlet from conception to implementation.
Both the beneficiaries of inefficient industries that could not sur-
108 See, e.g., Joel Bleifuss, The Grassroots Are Greener, UTNE READER, July-Aug.
1994, at 78 (claiming that an information clearinghouse organization works with
over 8,000 environmental groups).
109 See CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, WORLD DIRECTORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 17-28, 91-164 (Thaddeus C. Trzyna ed., 1989)
(categorizing environmental organizations by area of interest and nationality).
110 Recreationalists press for immediate use of environmental resources, con-
servationists press for future use of environmental resources, and preservationists
press for preservation of environments. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade, Values and
Differentiating Trade Sanctions: A Commentary on the Free Trade-Fair Trade Debate, in
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Alan 0. Sykes & Jagdeep S. Bhandiri
eds., forthcoming July 1996).
111 Indeed, unless Professor Shell proposes to extend standing to any and all
who seek it, including individuals, then he is not really advocating a system of
participatory government. He is instead proposing a system in which representa-
tion by governments will be replaced with representation by special interest
groups.
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vive competition and the recipients of monopolistic and oligopolis-
tic rents that are created by protectionist laws generally oppose
free trade.112 Frequently, these interest groups are extremely adept
at mobilizing resources against the implementation of trade liberal-
izing policies." 3 In contrast, the beneficiaries of trade liberalization
are far more diffuse and may not fully realize the benefits they gain
from free trade.114 These diffuse and unknowing beneficiaries are
less likely to mobilize resources to advocate implementation of free
trade and oppose protectionist measures.1 5 Based on this reason-
ing, Daniel Verdier notes that the President, who is responsible to
the entire nation, is generally more supportive of trade liberaliza-
tion than Senators or Representatives who are more vulnerable to
special interest constituencies within their jurisdictions." 6
The international trade regime provides a buffer between the
makers of trade policy and special interest groups. Having sorted
out trade policy issues at the national level, bureaucrats are free to
cooperate with other governments to maximize national and global
welfare without the intrusion of special interests.1 7 Allowing spe-
112 See Rowley & Tollison, supra note 93, at 143 (stating that artificial rents re-
sult from government intervention "designed to protect incumbent monopolists
from rent-removing competitive entry").
113 See Shell, supra note 37, at 878-79 (stating that uncompetitive producers
"mobilize labor and other constituencies to protect them from foreign competi-
tion").
114 See Rowley & Tollison, supra note 93, at 152 (noting that beneficiaries of
trade liberalization lack incentives to gather information, organize, or vote).
115 See id. at 151; see also Atlas, supra note 70, at C1 ("A person who loses his
job because of import competition knows [why he lost his job] ... but the guys on
both sides of his house don't necessarily know that their jobs exist, in part, be-
cause their employer is an exporter.") (quoting Robert McNeill, who heads the
Emergency Committee for American Trade).
116 See VERDIER, supra note 79, at 275 (arguing that Congress needed the Presi-
dent's help to "keep special interests at bay").
117 See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the
Law of International Trade, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 501, 517 (1985) (describing the differ-
ential pressures faced by bureaucrats and elected officials). Although remnants of
protectionism remain frustratingly stubborn, it cannot be denied that efforts to
liberalize trade have been very successful. "The various rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations have reduced tariffs to overall levels at which they no longer
create a serious obstacle to trade." Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The International Di-
mension of Competition Policy, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 833, 840 (1994). Indeed, much
of the global prosperity since the 1940s can be attributed to the liberalization of
trade rules. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECFIONISM 7-9 (1988) (refuting alternate
explanations to trade liberalization for post-war income growth); ANNE 0.
KRUEGER, PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 206-12 (1990) (estimating, for
example, that removing exchange controls could cause the value of Turkish
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cial interest groups to have standing before dispute settlement
panels would obviate that buffer and subject policymakers to an-
other level of protectionist pressure from special interest groups.
This pressure would be exacerbated by the mobilization of spe-
cial interest resources that might be engendered by expanding
standing to include those groups. Proceedings before dispute pan-
els would present enticing avenues for blocking trade liberaliza-
tion. Success before a panel could result in an immediate scaling
back of trade liberalization, and thus would be worthy of special
effort by a protectionist interest group. Even if protectionist
groups were unsuccessful, however, the panel proceedings them-
selves would evoke the emotional commitment inherent in a trial.
Whereas victories by special interest groups would immediately
impede trade, losses might become rallying cries for later - and
much more extensive - damage to the international trading sys-
tem.118
5. COMPARISON OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Professor Shell uses the European Union as a template for the
future of the World Trade Organization." 9 Comparisons between
the World Trade Organization and the European Union are inevi-
table and, at times, useful. 20 For purposes of standing, however,
comparisons between the European Union -which in some cases
allows private entities to have standing before the European Court
of Justice- and the World Trade Organization are meaningless.
manufacturing output per unit of new investment to "almost double").
118 Rather than one Tuna/Dolphin decision every 40 years, the World Trade
Organization might be faced with 40, or even 400, every year. See Belina Ander-
son, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy, 66 TEMPLE L.
REV. 751, 751 (1993) (reporting environmentalists' vigorous condemnation of the
Tuna/Dolphin decision and noting that some groups "even called for reconsid-
eration of the entire trade regime"). The Tuna/Dolphin decisions ruled that the
United States' practice of barring the importation of tuna from countries that
killed more than 1.25 times the number of dolphins killed by the U.S. tuna fleet
violated the General Agreement. Notably, the two Tuna/Dolphin decisions,
which did not reflect predominant values of some countries, including the United
States, never became GATT law. See Nichols, supra note 10 (noting that the deci-
sion of the dispute resolution panel was never submitted for the approval of the
contracting parties and therefore never became GATT law).
119 See Shell, supra note 37, at 922.
120 See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aid Control in the European Union:
Success or Failure, 18 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1212, 1213 (1995) (explaining that GATT
subsidies code drew from the experience of European Union state aid controls).
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The critical difference between the two entities is found in their
names. The European Union is a union. Its functions transcend
simple trade; it also facilitates social, political, and regulatory inte-
gration.' 21 Economic integration must be distinguished from eco-
nomic cooperation; the hard lesson of the European Union is that
economic integration is not possible without each of these other
forms of integration.122 A mere desire for economic integration,
however, will not necessarily lead to social integration. Of the ap-
proximately seventy regional trading arrangements, 123 none has
achieved the level of integration found in the European Union.
Observers attribute the European Union's integration not to extant
laws or economic policies, but instead to a commonality of values,
experiences, and perspectives. 24 Simply stated, the European Un-
ion is integrated because, among other things, it is integratable.
The World Trade Organization is an organization, not a union.
The goal of the World Trade Organization is to facilitate economic
cooperation, not economic integration, 125 and certainly not political
or social integration. Moreover, the 128 constituency countries of
the World Trade Organization 126 are located throughout the globe.
While exploring societal and cultural differences is beyond the
scope of this article, it is safe to assume that the European corn-
121 See STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW 23 (1993) ("The aspi-
rations of the Union... encompass economic, social and political matters.").
122 Cf. Nichols, supra note 10, at 706-07 ("[I]t is no more possible to extricate
an economy from the social mores in which it is embedded than it is to pull all of
the bones out of a living chicken.").
123 See Richard Harmsen & Michael Leidy, Regional Trading Arrangements, in 2
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND 88, 107-16 (Na-
heed Kirmani et al. eds, 1994) (documenting 68 agreements, ranging from prom-
ises of economic cooperation to complete economic union).
124 See Philip Allott, The European Community Is Not the True European Commu-
nity, 100 YALE L.J. 2485, 2492 (1991) ("[Dlemocracy... [as al system for com-
munalizing all socially significant decisionmaking in accordance with a society's
highest values.., has come to seem natural and normal to most people in West-
ern Europe.").
125 See, e.g., Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization
to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking, reprinted in
LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 58 (referring to "harmony," "coherence," and "coopera-
tion").
126 A year after its birth, the World Trade Organization has 112 members,
plus another 16 which have not yet converted their old GATT memberships, but
have joined the World Trade Organization in all but name. See Knock, Knock, supra
note 84, at 74. The waiting list of countries that have applied for World Trade Or-
ganization membership now stands at 27. See id.
2004] 695
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monalities are not replicated on a panglobal scale.'
27
The European Court of Justice also differs markedly from dis-
pute settlement panels and from the Dispute Settlement Body,
which administers those panels. 28 The European Court of Justice
is a permanent institution, distinct and independent of other Euro-
pean Union institutions. The fifteen members of the European
Court of Justice serve renewable six-year terms, 129 enjoy lifetime
immunity, 130 and cannot be removed from the bench except for ex-
treme cause.131 The Court has jurisdiction over a number of direct
actions. 32 The Court also has jurisdiction, at the request of a liti-
gating party, to issue rulings regarding interpretation of European
Union law in proceedings that originated and will terminate in
domestic courts. 33  This means of jurisdiction accounts for
"roughly half" of the privately initiated proceedings brought be-
fore the European Court of Justice,134 and is the avenue through
127 In fact, one need not travel too far from Europe to find a culture that does
not share the European commonalities. Turkey, which is strategically vital and
economically important to Europe, is consistently denied membership in the
European Union because of, among other things, a lack of common values. See
John Barham, Survey of Turkey: The Customs Union with Europe, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 22,
1996, at 26. It is possible that Turkey, which does share some European values
and 41% of whose citizens consider the country to be European, John Barham, The
Customs Union With Europe: Rumbles in the East as the Gate Opens, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
22, 1996, at 25, will join the European Union and will become even more culturally
integrated with Europe. While welcoming increased stability in Turkey, those
who have stood in the silent streets of Konya during noon prayers, or who have
enjoyed the shade of the little villages outside Kayseri, or who have celebrated
nightly feasts of Ramadan by Lake Van, will be saddened.
128 See Understanding, supra note 7, art. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1226 ("The Dispute
Settlement Body is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures
and ... the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agree-
ments.").
129 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC
TREATY] art. 167.
130 See Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Eco-
nomic Community, Apr. 17, 1957, art. 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 147, 148 (1958), amended by
22 OJ Eur. Comm. No. L291/9 (1979).
131 See id. art. 6, 298 U.N.T.S. at 148-49.
132 These include direct actions: against a member state for failure to fulfill an
obligation under various treaties or derived legislation; by the Council of Minis-
ters for annulment of a European Union measure; by a Member state or a Euro-
pean Union institution against another institution for failure to take a required
action; and against penalties imposed by the Union or for damages against the
Union. See JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 14-15 (1993).
133 See id.
134 Most of these proceedings are brought under article 177 of the EEC
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which the Court most often has refined its jurisprudence. 135
In contrast, the Dispute Settlement Board consists of the Gen-
eral Council-the legislative assembly of the organization-
functioning under a different name.136 The dispute settlement pan-
els themselves are created on an ad hoc basis.137 Parties to a dis-
pute may, but need not, appeal a decision of a dispute panel to the
Appellate Body, which consists of seven appointees with four-year
terms who hear appeals in three-judge panels.138 A dispute settle-
ment panel may be convened when a member country feels that
any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under one of the
trade agreements annexed to the World Trade Organization Char-
ter is being nullified or impaired. 39
Dispute settlement panels are an integral, and integrated, com-
ponent of the trade regulation process. Historically, panels pro-
ceeding under the General Agreement were consciously circum-
spect in their proceedings. 140 A core principle by which the panels
operated was that their role was simply "to make findings regard-
Treaty. See id.
135 See id. ("This indirect action has been the main source of clarification and
development of EC law.").
136 See Charter, supra note 6, art. IV(3), 33 I.L.M. at 1145. While it is function-
ing as the Dispute Settlement Body, the General Council may take on a different
chairperson. See id.
137 See Understanding, supra note 7, art. 6(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1230 (providing for
the establishment of a dispute resolution panel "[i]f the complaining party so re-
quests").
138 See id. art. 17, 33 I.L.M. at 1236. The rotation of Appellate Body members
is coordinated so that three members will always be available. See id. art. 17(1), 33
I.L.M. at 1236. Judges of the Appellate Body must represent the World Trade Or-
ganization membership and include "recognized" experts in law, international
trade, and the subject matter in dispute. See id. art. 17(3), 33 I.L.M. at 1236. Juris-
diction of the Appellate Body is limited to "issues of law covered in the panel re-
port and legal interpretations developed by the panel." Id. art. 17(6), 33 I.L.M. at
1236.
139 See id. arts. 3(3), 23, 33 I.L.M. at 1227, 1241. The trade agreements annexed
to the World Trade Organization Charter are: the Multilateral Agreement on
Trade in Goods, which includes the General Agreement as amended and now
known as GATT 1994, see Charter, supra note 6, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. at 1154; the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, see id. Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. at 1167; and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, see id. Annex
1C, 33 I.L.M. at 1197.
140 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform
in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 479 (1994) (stating that dispute settlement
under GATT primarily "aim[ed] at lowering tensions, diffusing conflicts, and
promoting compromise").
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ing [the] interpretation and application" 141 of the trade instru-
ments, even when the issue involved a provision that was facially
not viable or was widely disliked.142 This principle led at least one
panel to caution that its ruling should be taken merely as an inter-
pretation of the existing provisions, and should have no bearing on
negotiations involving the provision in question.
143
By contrast, the European Court of Justice is not restricted to an
interpretive role, but exercises discretion over the substantive de-
velopment of binding principles. As two European commentators
note:
The Court of Justice plays a significant role in the develop-
ment of the European Communities, to some extent compa-
rable with the role of the Supreme Court in the early years
of the United States of America. Both are constitutional
courts charged with the preservation and the development
of the law in a new society.44
It would be difficult to make such a grandiloquent claim for
dispute settlement panels.
Although the European Court of Justice and World Trade Or-
141 Canada, Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, Dec. 5, 1989,
GATT BISD 36th Supp. 68, 85 (1990).
142 See id. at 85 (discussing member nations' dissatisfaction with, and efforts
to revise the terms of, GATT Article XI:2(c)(i), an exception to the article under
which the United States brought the dispute against Canada). The understanding,
of course, was that the broader issues would then be discussed by all of the parties
to the General Agreement, who could then debate those issues and modify the
trade agreements as appropriate. Indeed, although many have applauded the fact
that Mexico declined to proffer the contentious Tuna/Dolphin panel decision for
a vote by the parties to the General Agreement, that decision has also been criti-
cized. "[T]he Panel Report affected all members of the General Agreement and
failure to more forward on the report was blocking progress on the larger debate
regarding the relationship between trade development and environmental protec-
tion." Stanley M. Spracker & David C. Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed
Attention on the Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment, 18 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 385, 386 n.7 (1993) (attributing argument to the European Community).
143 See European Economic Community, Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components, May 16, 1990, GATT BISD 37th Supp. 132, 199 (1991) (noting concur-
rent negotiations over the administration of anti-dumping laws and emphasizing
that its task was limited to interpreting "the existing provisions of the General
Agreement").
144 HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1 (5th ed. 1992) (footnote omitted).
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ganization dispute panels both hold hearings and resolve disputes,
dispute settlement panels are not courts and are not meant to be
courts. To have standing to appear before the European Court of
Justice is to have standing to appear before a court; to have stand-
ing to appear before a World Trade Organization dispute panel is
not. It is fair, of course, to argue in the hypothetical that effective
international trade governance requires the creation of a true inter-
national trade court, but that is a much different -and much more
hypothetical - argument than is the debate over standing before
dispute resolution panels. Neither expansion of standing nor an
increase in the formal trappings of the Dispute Settlement Body,
however, will transform that Body into a true court. The creation
of a court would require the creation of a new and distinct organ in
the World Trade Organization. Moreover, the many arguments
against expanding standing before dispute settlement panels
would be equally applicable to standing before such a court.
6. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIZING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
There can be little doubt that the World Trade Organization
shall and should deal with the interface between trade and other
global issues. Its forays into the realm of social regulation, how-
ever, must for the moment be circumscribed. When the concept of
sovereignty has lost all utility, when cultural differences have been
minimalized, and when all societies have roughly the same set of
values, then perhaps it will be possible and desirable for the World
Trade Organization to shoulder Shell's proposed role as arbiter of
social policy. At the present time, however, the World Trade Or-
ganization would collapse under the weight of societal differences,
and the benefits of trade liberalization would be lost.145
Similarly, calls for expanding the scope of standing before
World Trade Organization dispute resolution panels should be
heeded with caution. If, in the course of the World Trade Organi-
zation's evolution, a body of international trade law applicable to
individuals develops, then expanded standing may become desir-
able. At the moment, however, such calls are suspect. Far from
145 Alternatively, if the World Trade Organization were able to formulate and
impose a social charter, the organization would lose legitimacy in the eyes of
those cultures whose values the charter transgressed. As a result, the World
Trade Organization would ultimately lose both its viability as an international or-
ganization and the benefits of trade liberalization.
2004]
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"democratizing" the process, expanded standing could create a fo-
rum only for well-monied special interest groups. In all likelihood,
those groups would be more concerned with protecting their ad-
vantaged positions than in working for the common good.
The World Trade Organization is not the undemocratic institu-
tion that Professor Shell depicts; rather, it is a form of democracy
with which Professor Shell is unhappy. 46 Nonetheless, the fact
that the World Trade Organization is democratic does not mean
that it is perfect. The international trade regime has been roundly
criticized for myopically exalting trade above other social val-
ues.147 The impulse to legitimize the World Trade Organization by
bringing its decisions into line with prevailing values (within rea-
sonable moral bounds) is laudable. Popular perception of the
World Trade Organization as illegitimate could threaten the or-
ganization's ability to function, even to the point of collapse.
48
In order best to protect other interests -including societal val-
ues-it is not, however, standing that should be expanded, but
rather the composition of the dispute settlement panels themselves
that should be changed. The Understanding on Dispute Settlement
tilts composition of panels towards trade experts and, in practice,
panels have been composed entirely of trade bureaucrats and
scholars.149 However, by stating that "[p]anels shall be composed
of well-qualified governmental and/or nongovernmental indi-
146 Shell's unhappiness with the World Trade Organization's form of democ-
racy is somewhat surprising. The one country-one vote system that Shell casti-
gates as "relatively primitive," Shell, supra note 37, at 922, is no different from that
used in the U.S. Senate, or in the European Union's Council of Ministers. Indeed,
Professor Robert Hudec has argued, albeit in a different context, that international
negotiation of trade policy is no less "democratic" than the creation of policy
through the ordinary legislative process. Robert E. Hudec, "Circumventing" De-
mocracy: The Political Morality of Trade Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311,
312 (1993) (comparing the legitimacy of negotiated trade and domestic legisla-
tion).
147 See Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate:
Trade, Labour and the Environment, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 110 ("[F]ree traders have, in general, been too cavalier in their sum-
mary rejection of arguments that trade, environment, and labour should be
linked."); Nichols, supra note 10, at 700.
148 See Nichols, supra note 10, at 707-09. Howse and Trebilcock put it far more
prosaically: "If international trade law simply rules out of court any trade re-
sponse to the policies of other countries, however abhorrent, then there will be an
understandable, and dangerous, temptation to declare that international trade law
is an ass." Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 147, at 3.
149 See Understanding, supra note 7, art. 8(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1231.
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viduals, including" -as opposed to "limited to" -various types of
trade experts, the Understanding does allow room for nontrade
experts to sit on panels.15 0 This window must be taken advantage
of; experts in fields other than trade must be added to dispute reso-
lution panels. While the majority of panel members should con-
tinue to be trade experts, there also must be thoughtful interpreta-
tion of and proper attention given to nontrade values by those
most qualified to make such contributions. In a dispute that in-
volves trade restrictions on products produced by child labor, for
example, an official from the International Labour Organization
could be included on the panel; in a dispute over an environmental
measure, an international environmental scholar could join the
panel.
The World Trade Organization inherits from the GATT a world
in which trade plays a vital role. Because trade is a central activity
in human endeavors, the World Trade Organization must not turn
a blind eye toward trade's connection with other social issues.
Myopia, however, is cured not by changing what the eye is shown,
but instead by changing how the eye sees. Changes in the World
Trade Organization ultimately will depend not on who comes be-
fore its dispute panels, but instead on who makes the decisions.
150 Id. (emphasis added).
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